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LOW SAVINGS RATE: APPLYING THE 
SECTION 2255 “SAVINGS CLAUSE” TO 
FEDERAL SENTENCING CLAIMS IN 
GILBERT v. UNITED STATES 
Abstract: On May 19, 2011, in Gilbert v. United States, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a federal prisoner could not use 
the savings clause contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge collaterally 
an erroneous application of federal sentencing guidelines when the chal-
lenge was otherwise barred by the second or successive motion restriction. 
In doing so, the court closed off any avenue for relief for a significant 
number of federal prisoners who may have been sentenced erroneously. 
This Comment argues that the court’s interpretation of section 2255 
represents an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Introduction 
 In March of 1996, Ezell Gilbert pled guilty to possession with in-
tent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine.1 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Florida applied a career offender 
enhancement to Gilbert, increasing his minimum sentence from twelve 
years and seven months to twenty-four years and four months.2 Gilbert 
vigorously objected to the application of the enhancement, arguing 
that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon did not qual-
ify as a crime of violence, which was required by the sentencing guide-
lines for the enhancement.3 The district court rejected that claim, as 
did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1998 in United 
States v. Gilbert (Gilbert I ).4 After his appeal was denied, Gilbert again 
challenged his conviction in a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255; that motion was also denied.5 
 Ten years after Gilbert’s direct appeal, the Eleventh Circuit explic-
itly overruled Gilbert I, vindicating Gilbert’s argument that a conviction 
for carrying a concealed weapon was not a crime of violence for the 
                                                                                                                      
1 Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert III ), 640 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
2 See Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II ), 609 F.3d 1159, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 2010), va-
cated, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc, 640 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). 
3 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1300. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 1301. 
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purposes of the enhancement.6 The following year, Gilbert filed a sec-
ond motion to vacate his sentence, arguing that the enhancement was 
wrongly applied to him, an argument now bolstered by the change in 
Eleventh Circuit precedent.7 
 Gilbert, however, faced an obstacle due to new restrictions on post-
conviction challenges.8 In the years between Gilbert’s direct appeal and 
the Eleventh Circuit’s overruling of that decision, Congress passed the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which signifi-
cantly restricted the ability of federal prisoners to file more than one 
motion to vacate a federal sentence.9 In Gilbert’s case, an Eleventh Cir-
cuit panel held in Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II ) that although AEDPA 
prevented Gilbert from filing a second motion to vacate, the inadequacy 
of the motion allowed him to file for relief through the writ of habeas 
corpus.10 The Eleventh Circuit reheard the case en banc and held in 
Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert III ) that Gilbert was statutorily prevented 
from filing either a second motion to vacate or a petition for the writ of 
habeas corpus, leaving him with no recourse to challenge his sentence.11 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory standards 
under the AEDPA has important implications: the interpretation may 
severely limit post-conviction relief for erroneously sentenced federal 
convicts.12 The court’s interpretation limits relief under the statute so 
significantly that the restrictions arguably amount to an unconstitu-
tional suspension of habeas corpus as applied to Gilbert.13 
 Part I of this Comment gives the factual and procedural back-
ground relating to Gilbert’s arrest, trial, appeal, and collateral attacks 
on his sentence.14 Part II examines the key point of divergence between 
the Gilbert II decision and the Gilbert III decision.15 Finally, Part III ar-
gues that the Gilbert III interpretation of the relevant statute was incor-
                                                                                                                      
6 United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). 
7 See Gilbert v. United States, No. 8:99-CV-2054-T-30TGW, 2009 WL 981918, at *1, *2, 
*4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2009). 
8 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1301. 
9 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 105, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)). 
10 See Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1163, 1166–67. 
11 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1302, 1305, 1323. 
12 See id. at 1332 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
13 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
14 See infra notes 17–63 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 64–88 and accompanying text. 
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rect and that the statute, as interpreted by the Eleventh Circuit, repre-
sents an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.16 
I. Gilbert’s Conviction and Challenges within the Legal 
Landscape of Section 2255 Motions 
 After a criminal conviction and appeal, a federal prisoner may 
challenge his or her conviction or the resulting sentence using either a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate the conviction 
or sentence.17 Habeas corpus, enshrined in the Constitution by the 
Suspension Clause, guarantees the right of a prisoner to challenge the 
legality of his or her detention.18 Congress granted federal courts juris-
diction to issue the writ in 1789.19 Today, however, to challenge a fed-
eral conviction or sentence after an appeal, a prisoner may not use the 
writ of habeas corpus but must use a motion to vacate the conviction or 
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.20 Section 2255 allows a federal pris-
oner to move a federal court to vacate, set aside, or correct a sen-
tence.21 Congress devised section 2255 in 1948 as a more practical al-
ternative to habeas corpus petitions; like a habeas corpus petition, a 
section 2255 motion allows a federal prisoner to make a collateral chal-
lenge to a federal conviction or sentence.22 At the same time, Congress 
also added a restriction to section 2255 which requires federal prison-
ers to challenge their convictions through section 2255 and prohibited 
them from using writs of habeas corpus, except when a section 2255 
motion would be “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the 
detention.23 
                                                                                                                      
16 See infra notes 89–114 and accompanying text. 
17 See Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of Inno-
cence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals Convicted of 
Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 75, 82–83 (2005). 
18 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); see Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 12–15 (2d ed. 2010) (provid-
ing an early history of the Suspension Clause). 
19 Yackle, supra note 18, at 27. 
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
21 Id. 
22 United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 206, 219 (1952). Substituting a separate col-
lateral remedy for the writ of habeas corpus, as Congress did with section 2255, does not in 
itself constitute a suspension of habeas corpus. See id. at 223. The Supreme Court, however, 
has strongly implied that a Suspension Clause analysis would be required in cases where 
the substituted remedy was “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of a prisoner’s 
detention under section 2255. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); Hayman, 342 
U.S. at 223. 
23 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see Entzeroth, supra note 17, at 85. 
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 The conduct leading to Gilbert’s conviction occurred on October 
11, 1995 in Tampa, Florida.24 Tampa police observed suspicious activity 
involving Gilbert’s car and approached the car.25 While Gilbert reached 
for the car’s registration, a bag containing crack cocaine fell into plain 
view.26 The police searched the car and found sixty-seven grams of crack 
cocaine, two grams of powder cocaine, and one hundred and eleven 
grams of marijuana.27 
 In March of 1996, Gilbert pled guilty to possession of more than 
fifty grams of crack cocaine and more than one hundred grams of mari-
juana with intent to distribute.28 At sentencing, the U.S. District Court 
for the Middle District of Florida applied the career offender en-
hancement, which permits enhanced sentences for individuals with 
certain prior offenses.29 To be considered a career offender under the 
enhancement, the individual must have at least two prior convictions 
either for a crime of violence or for a controlled substance offense.30 
 At sentencing, the district court found that Gilbert had a prior 
controlled substance offense and also considered a prior conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon to be a “crime of violence.”31 Accordingly, 
the court found Gilbert to be a career offender for the purposes of the 
enhancement.32 Gilbert objected at sentencing that a conviction for 
carrying a concealed weapon should not be considered a “crime of vio-
lence” under the enhancement.33 Yet, the court overruled his objection 
                                                                                                                      
24 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1296. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1298. Although Tampa police arrested Gilbert and the State of Florida insti-
tuted criminal proceedings, the State dismissed charges in deference to a federal indict-
ment for the same conduct. Id. 
29 Id. at 1299; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1995). 
30 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1995). The Guidelines define “crime 
of violence” as: 
any offense under federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is bur-
glary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or other-
wise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another. 
Id. § 4B1.2. 
31 United States v. Gilbert (Gilbert I ), 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998) (direct ap-
peal), abrogated by United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008). 
32 Id.; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (1995). 
33 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1300. 
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and sentenced Gilbert to 292 months on the crack cocaine count and 
120 months on the marijuana count to run concurrently.34 
 Afterward, Gilbert filed the first of three attacks on his conviction 
and sentence.35 In 1997, he filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit, contending, among other claims, that 
the district court had erred in considering his conviction for carrying a 
concealed weapon to be a crime of violence under the career offender 
enhancement.36 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court.37 In September of 1999, in Gilbert’s second attack on his convic-
tion and sentence, he filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief 
under section 2255.38 The district court found that all of his claims 
lacked merit and denied the motion.39 
 The calculation of Gilbert’s sentence stood undisturbed for five 
years after his first section 2255 motion was denied.40 Then, in 2008, in 
Begay v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a conviction for 
driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act.41 Additionally, later in 2008, the Elev-
enth Circuit applied the Begay decision to the career offender en-
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. The court arrived at the sentences by applying the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. Id. at 1299–1300. The Guidelines function by providing a base offense level that cor-
responds to the crime charged. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 (1995). 
That base offense level is adjusted up or down depending on numerous aggravating and 
mitigating factors relating to the crime, the victim, and the defendant. Id. Then, a judge 
inputs that adjusted offense level and a second number, based on the criminal history of 
the defendant, into a rubric which provides a sentencing range. Id. In Gilbert’s case, the 
enhancement contained in the Guidelines altered both his adjusted offense level and the 
effect of his prior criminal history, resulting in a near doubling of the minimum sentence 
under the Guidelines from 12 years, 7 months to 24 years, 4 months. Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 
1300. At the time of Gilbert’s sentencing, imposing a sentence within the range provided 
by the Guidelines was mandatory. Id. 
35 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1301 (reviewing district court’s ruling on second collateral at-
tack, and discussing history of first collateral attack); Gilbert I, 138 F.3d at 1372 (direct ap-
peal). 
36 Gilbert I, 138 F.3d at 1372. 
37 Id. Gilbert’s motion for rehearing en banc and petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court were denied as well. Gilbert v. United States, 526 U.S. 1111 (1999) (deny-
ing petition for writ of certiorari); United States v. Gilbert, 156 F.3d 188, 188 (11th Cir. 
1998) (denying rehearing en banc). 
38 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1301 (recounting history of first collateral attack). Gilbert did 
not raise the issue of carrying a concealed weapon as a crime of violence in his first section 
2255 motion, likely because circuit precedent prevented Gilbert from pressing the same 
issues in a collateral attack as on direct appeal. See id. at 1331 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 1301 (majority opinion). 
40 Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. 
41 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008). 
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hancement in United States v. Archer.42 The Archer court held that a con-
viction for carrying a concealed weapon is not a “crime of violence” for 
the purposes of applying the career offender enhancement, explicitly 
overruling their prior holding in Gilbert’s appeal.43 
 In January 2009, responding to this change in Eleventh Circuit 
jurisprudence, Gilbert filed a second section 2255 motion to challenge 
his sentence.44 By this time, however, such collateral attacks were gov-
erned by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).45 
The enactment of the AEDPA restricted prisoners’ ability to challenge 
criminal sentences because it amended section 2255 to require prison-
ers to receive authorization from the appropriate court of appeals be-
fore making a second or successive section 2255 motion (the “second 
or successive bar”).46 The second or successive bar, when taken in con-
junction with the preexisting section 2255 prohibition against resorting 
to habeas corpus, limited prisoners’ post-appeal review, in most cases, 
to a single section 2255 motion.47 
 As a result, when Gilbert filed his third attack in 2009, he was faced 
with the problem that, despite the fact that the Eleventh Circuit in 
Archer agreed that the trial court had erroneously sentenced Gilbert, 
the second or successive bar prevented Gilbert from filing a second sec-
tion 2255 motion.48 He sought to avoid the second or successive bar by 
arguing that the court should construe his motion as a petition for ha-
beas corpus, not as a second section 2255 motion.49 For although sec-
tion 2255 prevents a federal prisoner from challenging a federal sen-
                                                                                                                      
42 Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. 
43 Id. 
44 Gilbert, 2009 WL 981918, at *1, *2. 
45 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104–
132, § 105, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006 & Supp. 
III 2009)). Congress passed the AEDPA in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing to 
“deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, [and] provide for an effective death penalty 
. . . .” Id. at pmbl.; see Deborah L. Stahlkopf, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions 
Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1115, 1116–
17 (1998). 
46 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 105. The amendment required that 
courts of appeals only authorize second or successive motions when new evidence is un-
covered that establishes that the prisoner is actually innocent of the offense or a new rule 
of constitutional law applies to the case that the Supreme Court holds to be retroactively 
applicable. See id. 
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alterna-
tives and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 171, 179–
81 (2003). 
48 Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1162; Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. 
49 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1302. 
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tence or conviction through a habeas corpus petition, that prohibition 
admits one exception, known as the “savings clause.”50 
 The savings clause allows a federal prisoner to challenge a convic-
tion or sentence through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus when 
section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his de-
tention.”51 The scope of the savings clause is not clear from the text of 
section 2255, and the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on the 
issue.52 In fact, from the enactment of the savings clause in 1948 until 
the enactment of the AEDPA, the savings clause received relatively little 
attention.53 With the arrival of the restrictions on post-conviction relief 
contained in the AEDPA, however, the scope of the savings clause has 
become a very live issue on which the circuits have differed.54 
 The test for the application of the savings clause in the Eleventh 
Circuit was set out in 1999 in Wofford v. Scott.55 In Gilbert’s case, the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida applied the Wofford test 
and concluded that the test required that the prisoner be convicted of 
a nonexistent offense for the savings clause to apply.56 The district 
court found that Gilbert’s motion challenged his sentence, not his con-
viction, and declined to apply the savings clause.57 
                                                                                                                     
 Gilbert appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, and a panel of the court 
reversed the district court’s decision.58 The Gilbert II court reasoned that 
because an erroneously applied career offender enhancement was suffi-
ciently similar to a conviction for a nonexistent offense, Gilbert satisfied 
the Wofford test.59 Accordingly, the court held that the savings clause al-
lowed Gilbert to file a habeas petition challenging his sentence.60 
 The government petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which was 
granted.61 On rehearing, the Gilbert III court affirmed the district court’s 
denial of relief, but declined to apply the Wofford test, stating that the 
test was merely dicta.62 The Gilbert III court then determined that the 
 
50 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). 
51 Id. 
52 See Entzeroth, supra note 17, at 86. 
53 See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 206; Hack, supra note 47, at 190. 
54 See Hack, supra note 47, at 190–91. 
55 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999). 
56 Gilbert, 2009 WL 981918, at *3–4. 
57 Id. at *4. 
58 Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1160. 
59 Id. at 1165. 
60 Id. at 1166–67. 
61 Gilbert v. United States, 625 F.3d 716, 716 (11th Cir. 2010) (granting petition for re-
hearing en banc and vacating Gilbert II ). 
62 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1319 & n.20. 
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savings clause does not apply to sentencing claims like Gilbert’s, where 
the sentence is less than the statutory maximum for the charged of-
fense.63 
II. Conflicting Interpretations of the Savings Clause 
 The main point of divergence between the Gilbert II panel and the 
Gilbert III court is whether the savings clause applies to federal prisoners 
who challenge their sentences.64 Both the district court and the Gilbert 
II panel applied the Wofford test to determine if the savings clause 
should apply to Gilbert’s sentencing claim.65 In 1999, in Wofford v. Scott, 
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit set out a 
three-prong test to determine when to apply the savings clause to chal-
lenges to federal convictions and sentences.66 To satisfy the Wofford test 
(1) the claim must be based upon a retroactively applicable U.S. Su-
preme Court decision, (2) the holding of the Supreme Court decision 
must establish that the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent of-
fense, and (3) circuit precedent must have “squarely foreclosed” the 
claim at the time it otherwise should have been raised.67 
 The Gilbert II panel held that Gilbert’s claim satisfied both the first 
and third prong of the Wofford test.68 The panel also held that Gilbert’s 
position of being sentenced as a career offender with only one predi-
cate offense satisfied the second prong of the Wofford test: that a Su-
preme Court decision must establish that the prisoner was convicted 
for a nonexistent offense.69 The panel reasoned that the career of-
fender enhancement is, in essence, a separate offense—one that has its 
own elements, provides for additional punishment, and, accordingly, 
should be treated as an offense of conviction for the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                      
63 Id. at 1323. 
64 See Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert III ), 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (en 
banc); Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II ), 609 F.3d 1159, 1166–67 (11th Cir. 2010), va-
cated, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc, 640 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). 
65 Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1166–67; Gilbert v. United States, No. 8:99-CV-2054-T-30TGW, 
2009 WL 981918, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2009). 
66 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999). 
67 Id. The Wofford Court’s analysis focused on the decisions of other circuits interpret-
ing the savings clause in light of the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in Bailey v. United 
States. Id. at 1242; see Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Bailey held that a statute 
that criminalized using a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime requires 
active employment of the firearm. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143. Because Bailey resulted in many 
prisoners being jailed for nonexistent offenses, the Wofford court considered the applica-
tion of the savings clause in that context. Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1242. 
68 Gilbert II, 609 F.3d at 1165. 
69 Id. 
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Wofford test.70 The Gilbert II panel considered this expansion of the sec-
ond prong of the Wofford test as necessary to avoid constitutional ques-
tions related to the second or successive bar.71 
 In contrast, the en banc Gilbert III court concluded the Wofford test 
did not apply to Gilbert’s claim.72 The court rejected the rationale of 
the Gilbert II court—that the career offender enhancement is so similar 
to a crime of conviction that Gilbert was in essence convicted of a non-
existent offense.73 The court noted that Gilbert was not separately 
charged with or convicted of being a career offender, but rather was 
charged with and convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent 
to distribute, a conviction that was not contested.74 
 Further, the Gilbert III court held that the savings clause could not 
be as robust as Gilbert and the Gilbert II panel believed and found sec-
tion 2255 to be adequate and effective in Gilbert’s case.75 At the outset 
the Gilbert III court decided that the mere fact that section 2255 does 
not provide a remedy to a prisoner—as when the second or successive 
bar prevents a prisoner from filing a motion—does not, in itself, trigger 
the savings clause.76 The court concluded that something more is re-
quired and that the concern for finality, inherent in the limitations on 
collateral review added by the AEDPA, prevents claims of sentencing 
error from being that “something more” sufficient to trigger the savings 
clause.77 Although the Gilbert III court did not categorically hold that 
the savings clause could never apply to a sentencing claim, the court 
implied that the savings clause would only be applied in cases of convic-
tion for a nonexistent offense.78 The Gilbert III court found support for 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1163. The court concluded that where a prisoner had a claim that went to the 
fundamental legality of his sentence, the second or subsequent bar might foreclose all 
relief creating “serious constitutional issues.” Id. The court elaborated that allowing indi-
viduals to remain imprisoned without allowing them to bring claims going to the funda-
mental legality of their sentences may give rise to constitutional claims in that “the right 
not to be imprisoned for a nonexistent offense is probably inherent in the modern inter-
pretation of substantive due process.” Id. at 1165 n.11. 
72 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1319–20. The court referred to the Wofford test as dicta, 
noting that the holding of Wofford was merely that the savings clause didn’t apply to sen-
tencing claims that could have been raised in proceedings prior to a second section 2255 
motion. Id. at 1319. 
73 Id. at 1320. 
74 Id. 
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006 & Supp. III 2009); Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1308, 1323. 
76 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1308. 
77 See id. at 1312. 
78 See id. at 1312–15. The court suggested that its analysis might be different where a sen-
tencing error resulted in a sentence greater than the statutory maximum. See id. at 1323. 
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this reading of the savings clause in the decisions of other circuits, not-
ing that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fifth, and 
Seventh Circuits, using similar reasoning, also held that federal prison-
ers cannot use the savings clause to challenge sentencing determina-
tions.79 
 In holding that Gilbert could not challenge his sentence either 
through a second section 2255 motion or a petition for the writ of ha-
beas corpus, the Gilbert III court recognized that he had no judicial re-
course available to challenge his sentence.80 Yet, in Felker v. Turpin, in 
1996, the Supreme Court held that the restrictions placed on second or 
successive motions by AEDPA, on their face, did not violate the Suspen-
sion Clause.81 Relying on Felker, the Gilbert III court held that the sec-
ond or successive bar as applied to Gilbert did not violate the Suspen-
sion Clause.82 Nonetheless, the dissent argued that this operation of 
the second or successive bar might amount to an unconstitutional sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus.83 
                                                                                                                     
 In addition, the Gilbert III court considered broader, constitutional 
policy issues of habeas corpus.84 The court rejected the suggestion that 
more recent Supreme Court decisions supported the view that there 
had been a suspension in Gilbert’s case.85 For example, in 2008, in 
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause 
guarantees noncitizens held outside of U.S. sovereign territory the 
privilege of invoking the writ of habeas corpus.86 In so holding, the Su-
preme Court affirmed that the Suspension Clause provides the thresh-
old right of all prisoners to a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
legality of their detention.87 Nonetheless, the Gilbert III court held 
Boumediene inapplicable on the grounds that Boumediene challenged ex-
ecutive detention of noncitizens, not detention upon conviction and 
sentence by a federal court, and on the grounds that the Boumediene 
 
79 Id. at 1312–16 (citing Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835–36 (7th Cir. 2002); Okereke 
v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 
458, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001); Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 213–14 (5th Cir. 2000); In re 
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
80 See id. at 1295, 1324. 
81 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996). 
82 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1317–18. 
83 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting); id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J. dis-
senting). 
84 Id.; see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
85 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1318. 
86 553 U.S. at 770–71. 
87 Id. at 779. 
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holding concerned the right to habeas corpus review at all, not the 
right to successive rounds of such review.88 
III. The Case for a Robust Savings Clause 
 The Gilbert III court’s analysis of the savings clause is flawed in sev-
eral respects.89 For one, the Gilbert III court’s argument fails to provide 
a sufficient justification for the different outcomes in section 2255 mo-
tions based on convictions for nonexistent offenses and those based on 
sentencing errors.90 Additionally, the Gilbert III court’s holding leaves 
Gilbert without the opportunity to bring a claim that his sentence was 
erroneously calculated, even though the Supreme Court had since de-
termined that Gilbert was not a career offender under the guidelines.91 
By interpreting section 2255 to preclude the opportunity to bring such 
a claim, the court created a serious question as to whether section 2255 
unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus.92 
 Rather than providing reasoning to justify the different outcomes 
between section 2255 motions based on convictions for nonexistent of-
fenses and those based on sentencing errors, the court relied on the 
need for finality and the non-binding precedent of other circuits.93 In-
stead, the majority reasoned that the second or successive bar does not 
by itself make section 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” and that such an 
emasculation of the second or successive bar would be contrary to the 
finality principles that underpin the AEDPA.94 Yet such reasoning is in-
sufficient because there are certain times when the savings clause does 
                                                                                                                      
88 Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1318. 
89 See Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert III ), 640 F.3d 1293, 1331–35 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(Martin, J., dissenting). 
90 See id. at 1312 (majority opinion). 
91 See id. at 1330 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 1312–16 (majority opinion) (citing Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835–36 (7th 
Cir. 2002); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2001); Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d 209, 213–14 (5th 
Cir. 2000); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Gilbert III court 
reasoned that all of the above cited cases are broadly supportive of limiting operation of 
the savings clause to cases of actual innocence of a crime of conviction. See id.; Taylor, 314 
F.3d at 835–36 (interpreting section 2255 to require a constitutional defect equivalent to 
conviction for nonexistent offense); Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120–21 (implying same). Not all of 
these cases, however, categorically preclude sentencing claims in Gilbert’s situation. See, 
e.g., Peterman, 249 F.3d at 462 (stating that the court was not determining the exact scope 
of the savings clause beyond its application to the prisoners in that case); Kinder, 222 F.3d 
at 214 (noting that prisoner had the opportunity to raise the claim in an earlier section 
2255 motion); Davenport, 147 F.3d at 609 (same). 
94 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1308. 
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operate to allow a federal prisoner to file a petition for habeas corpus 
despite the second or successive bar.95 Furthermore, finality, although 
an important concern within the criminal justice system, is naturally lim-
ited by competing constitutional concerns.96 Thus, the savings clause 
problem is one of careful balancing between competing interests.97 
 The Gilbert III court’s reasoning is also unwise in that it creates a 
strong probability that the second or successive bar violates the Suspen-
sion Clause of the Constitution.98 The court, in drawing the line at all 
sentencing claims, completely eliminates judicial review for sentencing 
claims made by federal prisoners arising only after the prisoners’ first 
section 2255 motions.99 
 Yet because section 2255 was intended as a more efficient substi-
tute to the writ of habeas corpus, statutory interpretation of section 
2255 should be governed by Suspension Clause concerns.100 The Gilbert 
III court, in considering the Suspension Clause issue, looked to the Su-
preme Court’s 1996 case, Felker v. Turpin, which held that a second or 
successive bar does not, on its face, unconstitutionally suspend ha-
beas.101 Accordingly, the Gilbert III court considered Felker determinative 
authority that second or successive restrictions do not unconstitution-
ally suspend the writ.102 The court, however, failed to seriously consider 
whether, as applied to the facts of Gilbert’s case, the second or successive 
bar amounted to a suspension of the writ.103 As noted in Judge Beverly 
Martin’s dissent in Gilbert III, in this regard it is helpful to consider the 
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. at 1312–15. The court implied that where the second or successive bar oper-
ates to deprive a prisoner of the ability to bring a claim, alleging that the prisoner was con-
victed of a nonexistent offense, relief under the motion would be “inadequate or ineffec-
tive” to test the legality of the detention, which would trigger the savings clause. See id. 
96 See id. at 1337 (Hill, J., dissenting); Hack, supra note 47, at 223. 
97 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1324. 
98 See id. at 1331 (Martin, J., dissenting); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 537, 561 (2010) (implying that Boumedi-
ene suggests habeas review of judicial detention is required). Unlike the court in Gilbert III, 
the Supreme Court has exhibited reluctance to interpret statutes in a way that creates serious 
questions of constitutional suspension. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001) (suggesting 
that when interpreting statutes, the Court will err on the side of an interpretation that does 
not create “serious and difficult constitutional issue[s]”). 
99 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1331–32 (Martin, J., dissenting); Hack, supra note 47, at 
196. 
100 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting) (arguing that accepting 
the marjority’s statutory interpretation forces the question of constitutional suspension); 
cf. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305 (interpreting statute so as to avoid “serious and difficult constitu-
tional issue[s]”). 
101 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1317. 
102 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1317. 
103 See id. at 1330 n.2 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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history of Gilbert’s case.104 The majority’s decision would leave Gilbert 
without any opportunity for collateral review of his claim, despite the 
fact that the claim only became available after a change in the law that 
was subsequent to his first section 2255 motion.105 
 This conclusion—that Gilbert lacks any opportunity to obtain ju-
dicial review of his claim—is in tension with the conception of habeas 
corpus as set out in the 2008 Supreme Court case, Boumediene v. Bush.106 
On the one hand, the Gilbert III court was correct that Boumediene ap-
plies to noncitizens held subject to executive detention.107 On the 
other hand, however, Boumediene, explicitly sets out baseline elements 
required of an adequate substitute for habeas corpus so as not to be an 
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.108 Further, in describing the 
essence of habeas corpus, the Court stated that “the privilege of habeas 
corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demon-
strate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or 
interpretation’ of relevant law.”109 Although a “meaningful opportu-
nity” likely does not mean that prisoners may use the writ to file peti-
tions that could have been filed previously, Gilbert had no opportunity 
to have a court examine the legality of his sentence in light of the 
change in the law.110 For that reason, given the Gilbert III court’s inter-
pretation of the savings clause, the court likely suspended Gilbert’s 
right to the writ of habeas corpus.111 
 In contrast, the Gilbert II court recognized the Suspension Clause 
trap involved in overly restricting the operation of the savings clause.112 
By modifying the test set out by the Eleventh Circuit in 1999 in Wofford 
v. Scott, the Gilbert II panel more pragmatically interpreted section 2255, 
by finding a black-letter rule for the savings clause, but modifying the 
rule where section 2255 was plainly “inadequate or ineffective.”113 Such 
an approach, although possibly allowing some abuse of the writ at the 
margins, is more consistent with the plain meaning of the savings 
                                                                                                                      
104 Id. at 1331 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 1331–32. 
106 See id. at 1331; Neuman, supra note 98, at 561. 
107 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) 
108 Id. at 779; see Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1318; Neuman, supra note 98, at 560. 
109 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. 
110 See Gilbert III, 640 F.3d at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
111 See id.; id. at 1330–31 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
112 See Gilbert v. United States (Gilbert II ), 609 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010), va-
cated, 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc, 640 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2011). 
113 See id. at 1163–65; see also Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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clause and avoids creating an unnecessary constitutional issue out of 
the second or successive bar.114 
Conclusion 
 The Gilbert III court held that a sentencing error cannot trigger the 
savings clause in section 2255 as long as the resulting sentence is less 
than the statutory maximum. Yet such a conception of the savings 
clause effectively reads the savings clause out of existence for an entire 
class of prisoners who might have legitimate sentencing claims, which 
could not have been raised before a second section 2255 motion. The 
result of such a statutory interpretation is that the second or successive 
bar likely becomes an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus as applied to individuals like Gilbert. Instead, the better path is 
that of the Gilbert II court, which, by setting out a rule for applying the 
savings clause and modifying it in response to a case where section 2255 
appeared “inadequate or ineffective,” remains consistent with the plain 
meaning of the savings clause and avoids any Suspension Clause impli-
cations stemming from an impotent savings clause. 
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